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Abstract
Purpose: This paper formalizes long-term trajectories of human civilization as a 
scientific and ethical field of study. The long-term trajectory of human civilization can be
defined as the path that human civilization takes during the entire future time period in 
which human civilization could continue to exist.
Approach: We focus on four types of trajectories: status quo trajectories, in which 
human civilization persists in a state broadly similar to its current state into the distant 
future; catastrophe trajectories, in which one or more events cause significant harm to 
human civilization; technological transformation trajectories, in which radical 
technological breakthroughs put human civilization on a fundamentally different course; 
and astronomical trajectories, in which human civilization expands beyond its home 
planet and into the accessible portions of the cosmos.
Findings: Status quo trajectories appear unlikely to persist into the distant future, 
especially in light of long-term astronomical processes. Several catastrophe, 
technological transformation, and astronomical trajectories appear possible.
Value: Some current actions may be able to affect the long-term trajectory. Whether 
these actions should be pursued depends on a mix of empirical and ethical factors. For 
some ethical frameworks, these actions may be especially important to pursue.
Keywords: long-term trajectories, human civilization
1. Introduction
What will human civilization look like in one million, one billion, or one trillion years? 
These are questions of broad scientific and ethical significance, yet they are neither well-
studied nor well-understood. While cosmology has probed stellar and physical dynamics 
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in the deep future (Adams 2008), studies of human futures in demography, economics, 
sustainability science, political science, and related disciplines tend to concentrate on 
upcoming decades, often relying on simple extrapolations of existing trends, or on 
scenario writing. But important civilizational processes could play out over longer time 
scales. To restrict attention to near-term decades may be akin to the drunk searching for 
his keys under the streetlight: it may be where empirical study is more robust, but the 
important part lies elsewhere.
In this paper, we seek to formalize long-term trajectories of human civilization as a 
scientific and ethical field of study. We synthesize perspectives from a range of fields, 
including moral philosophy, demography, economics, sustainability science, risk 
analysis, futures studies, political science, archaeology, climatology, and astrobiology. 
Using insights from these fields, we establish four broad classes of trajectories and 
describe important details for each. The four classes of trajectories are:
(1) Status quo trajectories, in which human civilization persists in a state broadly 
similar to its current state into the distant future
(2) Catastrophe trajectories, in which one or more events cause significant harm to 
human civilization
(3) Technological transformation trajectories, in which radical technological 
breakthroughs put human civilization on a fundamentally different course
(4) Astronomical trajectories, in which human civilization expands beyond its home 
planet and into the accessible portions of the cosmos
These four classes of trajectories represent the major potential long-term trajectories 
of human civilization. They depict human civilization staying roughly level (1), shrinking
(2), or potentially expanding via technological breakthrough (3) or astronomical 
expansion (4). Scenarios that do not fit in any one of these four classes appear unlikely. 
Some scenarios can fit in multiple classes: for example, technological breakthrough could
lead to either catastrophe or astronomical expansion. However, each class contains 
distinct features worthy of separate consideration and drawing on separate scholarly 
traditions. Status quo trajectories draw from the trend extrapolations of demography, 
economics, sustainability science, and related disciplines (e.g., Field et al. 2014; United 
Nations 2017a). Catastrophe trajectories draw from analysis of global catastrophic and 
existential risks, in particular studies of the aftermath of these events (e.g, Maher and 
Baum 2013; Dartnell 2014; Denkenberger and Pearce 2014). Technological 
transformation trajectories draw from futures studies, especially related to technological 
singularity and related notions of radical technological change (e.g., Miller 2012; Eden et 
al. 2012; Hanson 2016). Finally, astronomical trajectories draw from astrobiology, 
relating the socio-technological possibilities of space travel to the astronomical structure 
of the universe (e.g., Ćirković 2002; Haqq-Misra and Baum 2009; Armstrong and 
Sandberg 2013). To our knowledge, these various lines of inquiry have not previously 
been synthesized into a formal study of long-term trajectories of human civilization.1
1 Some prior studies covering similar ground include Maher and Baum (2013), which analyzes long-term 
trajectories mainly in the context of catastrophe scenarios but with some attention to status quo and 
astronomical trajectories, and Beckstead (2013), which develops moral philosophy arguments for caring 
about long-term trajectories.
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The study of long-term trajectories is further important because some current actions 
may affect long-term outcomes. These include actions that affect the risk of catastrophe, 
the onset of transformative technologies, or the expansion of human civilization into 
outer space. How these actions should be evaluated depends on empirical details about 
the nature of long-term trajectories as well as ethical theories concerning the trajectories’ 
valuation.
In Section 2, we further develop the conceptual and ethical foundations of long-term 
trajectories of human civilization. We argue that the trajectories can be defined and 
evaluated in a variety of ways, consistent with a variety of empirical and ethical 
perspectives. We discuss details of status quo and catastrophe trajectories in Sections 3 
and 4. Section 5 presents sketches of possible technological transformation and 
astronomical trajectories. We discuss details of technological transformation and 
astronomical trajectories in Sections 6 and 7. Section 8 concludes.
2. Conceptual and Ethical Foundations
The long-term trajectory of human civilization can be defined as the path that human 
civilization takes into the long-term future. The long-term can in turn be defined as the 
entire future time period in which human civilization could continue to exist. Given 
uncertainty about which trajectory human civilization will take, we speak in terms of 
trajectories in the plural, to emphasize the variety of trajectories that appear possible from
our current vantage point.
Human civilization is a more complex concept. Dictionary definitions of civilization 
emphasize an advanced state of cultural, organizational, social, and technological 
development.2 “Human” could be defined as the species Homo sapiens sapiens. 
However, over long time scales, human descendants are likely to become a different 
species via genetic drift (Wills 2008). It may also be possible for humans (or their 
descendants) to engineer new biological species or non-biological beings (e.g., robots) 
that are capable of continuing civilization into the future (More and Vita-More 2010). 
Therefore, this paper uses the term “human civilization” to refer to any civilization that 
traces to the current human population. This definition includes civilizations led by 
genetic descendants of Homo sapiens sapiens, as well as civilizations led by biological or
non-biological beings that are engineered by Homo sapiens sapiens or its genetic 
descendants. This definition permits a study of long-term trajectories that does not need 
to constantly account for whether the civilization is still in some sense “human”.
It will often be advantageous to think of the trajectories in quantitative terms, in the 
form of one or more time series. In other words, specific trajectories are what one obtains
from plotting one or more key attributes of human civilization (on which more shortly) as
a function of time, with time going from the present into the long-term future. A full 
understanding of long-term trajectories also requires qualitative description of what is 
going on in the trajectories: the story behind the numbers.
Figure 1 shows some illustrative trajectories. These trajectories are for illustrative 
purposes only; no precision is intended. Also, these are not the only forms that the 
trajectories could take. Indeed, as discussed throughout this paper, the trajectories could 
have a variety of forms and could in some cases even be negative. Note that Figure 1 
2 See e.g. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/civilization; 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/civilization.
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does not label the vertical axis. Instead, it uses an unspecified aggregate measure of 
human civilization. Other figures throughout this paper do the same. This is done in 
deference to the possibility of using a variety of measures for the total size of a 
civilization. Plots of attributes other than total size, such as averages across the 
population or the degree of inequality within the population, may appear differently.
Time
Positive Technological Transformation
and/or Astronomical Trajectory
Status Quo Trajectory
Catastrophe Trajectory
Figure 1. Illustrative trajectories.
This raises the question of which attributes of human civilization should be focused 
on. Studies of near-term trajectories tend to focus on population, economic production, 
quality of life, and select natural resources and other environmental parameters. These 
attributes can also be considered for long-term trajectories, though with some 
complications. Over the long-term, human civilization may not be using the same natural 
resources as it currently is, and the environment may change sufficiently that near-term 
environmental parameters are unimportant. The form of civilization may likewise change 
enough that current conceptions of economic production, security, and quality of life do 
not meaningfully apply. Even current conceptions of population could be inapplicable to 
some long-term scenarios, such as those in which civilization is led by something other 
than Homo sapiens sapiens.
Given the wide range of long-term possibilities, we call for greater care in the 
selection of attributes for quantifying long-term trajectories than for short-term 
trajectories, and for greater emphasis on qualitative descriptions to clarify what is going 
on in different trajectories. 
As with near-term trajectories, the selection of attributes can also depend on ethical 
factors. While a complete review of ethical theories is beyond the scope of this paper, 
what follows is a partial overview.3 Some ethical theories value total quality of life 
aggregated across the population, while others value average quality of life of members 
of the population, and still others favor improvements for the less well-off members of 
the population (Ng 1989; Arrhenius 2000; Adler 2012). The average-based theories 
3 More detailed discussions of ethical issues of relevance to long-term trajectories and other future 
outcomes can be found in, among other sources, Portney and Weyant (1999), Weisbach and Sunstein 
(2007), Schwartz and Milligan (2016), Scheffler (2018), and Tonn (2018).
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would have less interest in tracking the population in different trajectories, while those 
focused on the less well-off members would be especially interested in inequality in 
distributions across population members for different trajectories. A different type of 
theory values the survival and flourishing of humanity into the future, but does not value 
its instantaneous size or per-person metrics (Schwartz 2011; Frick 2017). Ethical theories
also diverge on the (dis)value of deception, i.e. on whether ignorance is bliss (Nozick 
1974; Ng 1990; Sagan 2006).4 These theories point to different attributes, especially for 
scenarios involving large-scale deception, such as if human minds are confined to virtual 
reality environments.5 Other points of divergence are on whether the natural environment 
(Norton 1984; Agar 2000; Morito 2003) or non-human animal welfare (Johansson-
Stenman 2018) are of intrinsic value—valuable for its own sake—or only of instrumental
value as something that improves human civilization. This divergence points in different 
directions for scenarios in which human civilization thrives while causing greater and 
greater harm to natural environments or non-human animal populations. Finally, there is 
also divergence on how much importance to place on suffering and/or other negative 
value relative to happiness and/or other positive value (e.g., Baum 2008; Gloor and 
Mannino 2016; Sotala and Gloor 2017). Ethical theories emphasizing negative value 
would tend to be more interested in tracking the long-term trajectories of negative value, 
and vice versa for positive value. Indeed, ethical theories emphasizing negative value 
could even consider the survival and growth of the human population to be a bad thing if 
it substantially increased the amount of suffering.
These are among the reasons why ethical theory is an important part of the study of 
long-term trajectories. Another important reason is for the relation of long-term 
trajectories to contemporary human affairs. This is because some current actions could 
affect the long-term trajectory of human civilization, including actions that change the 
risk of major catastrophes, the prospects for radical technological breakthrough, and/or 
the prospects for the colonization of outer space. The importance of these actions depends
on their effect on long-term trajectories and on how much long-term trajectories are 
valued. Some ethical theories have inter-temporal neutrality, valuing long-term effects as 
much as short-term effects, while other ethical theories discount future values or only 
value that which affects existing persons (Parfit 1984; Arrhenius 2003; Weinberg 2008).6 
Interpreting the significance of long-term trajectories for contemporary human affairs 
requires attention to these and other ethical issues.
As an illustration of the significance of long-term trajectories for contemporary 
human affairs, consider the case of time-neutral total utilitarianism, in which all welfare
—human or otherwise—is valued equally, regardless of when it occurs. We stress that 
4 Nozick (1974: 44-45) argues against “experience machines” that provide people with seemingly fulfilling 
but false virtual realities; Sagan (2006: 217-218) argues against ignorance and proposes an 11th 
commandment of “Thou shalt understand the world, figure things out”. In contrast, Ng (1990) argues that 
accurate knowledge should only be valued to the extent that it increases welfare, and it should be disvalued 
if it reduces welfare.
5 For one argument to this effect, see Bostrom (2003). Such scenarios are dramatized in the popular film 
The Matrix. An alternative perspective on these scenarios proposes that they are not actually deceptive, but 
instead involve different processes underlying the same reality we believe to exist (Chalmers 2005).
6 Ethical theories that only value existing persons may nonetheless place some concern on long-term 
trajectories insofar as existing people care about long-term trajectories; see Finneron-Burns (2017, Section 
2.4).
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this view is selected for illustration purposes only and is not intended as an endorsement,7
nor do we claim that this is the only view for which long-term trajectories are important. 
This view would place great value on long-term trajectories involving large amounts of 
welfare. This leads to some potential claims about what current decision making should 
prioritize:
(A) Reducing the risk of human extinction, because extinction would result in the loss of 
all future generations.
(B) Reducing the risk of major catastrophes that would lead to the permanent loss of 
advanced human civilization.
(C) Expediting technological breakthroughs and ensuring that they would improve 
welfare.
(D) Expediting space colonization and ensuring that it would improve welfare.
(E) Improving near-term welfare, because long-term trajectories will be the same either 
way, or because the effect of current decisions on long-term trajectories is not 
understood well enough to guide decision making.
One can imagine a case for each of these five claims. (A) could hold if humanity 
faces extinction threats and if extinction is the only thing that could change its long-term 
trajectory. (B) could hold if humanity faces major catastrophic risks and if such 
catastrophes would diminish the long-term trajectory. (C) could hold if technological 
breakthroughs can be achieved before catastrophe occurs. (D) could hold if space 
colonization can be achieved before catastrophe occurs and before a technology 
breakthrough occurs. Finally, (E) could hold if contemporary actions would not affect 
long-term trajectories.
As noted in Section 1, attention typically goes to (E), though without consideration of
long-term trajectories. Prior literature studying the matter has tended to support either (A)
or (B). Sagan (1983), Parfit (1984), Ng (1991), and Matheny (2007) argue for prioritizing
the reduction of human extinction risk on grounds that extinction would end all future 
generations. Bostrom (2013) and Maher and Baum (2013) argue for prioritizing the 
reduction of the risk of any catastrophe that would cause significant long-term harm to 
human civilization. Similarly, Beckstead (2013) argues for any action that improves long-
term trajectories and suggests inconclusively that reducing the risk of these long-term 
catastrophes may be the most effective approach. However, this prior literature generally 
lacks careful empirical study of potential long-term trajectories, making it difficult to 
assess which claim is correct or how to weigh them in decision making.
3. Status Quo Trajectories
Status quo trajectories involve the current civilization continuing in something like its 
current form into the long-term future. Status quo trajectories do not necessarily involve 
total stasis—indeed, stasis may be unlikely—but they do involve the continuation of 
current trends without major discontinuities. 
Exactly what qualifies as a status quo trajectory is a fuzzy and debatable matter. It 
could refer to continuity in the state of human civilization, or continuity in the trends of 
7 Indeed, some of the authors of this paper disagree with this view.
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change in the state, or even continuity in trends in changes of trends.8 For example, the 
current human population is steadily increasing at a decreasing rate. Another matter is 
how large and/or abrupt of a deviation there needs to be for a trajectory to no longer 
qualify as status quo. The accumulation of status-quo trends in economic and 
technological development, and in environmental and resource degradation, compounded
over decades, centuries, millennia, or even longer, likely results in something very 
different from the present civilization. It is a matter of interpretation whether this 
difference is large enough to qualify as outside the status quo. Indeed, some projections 
of catastrophe derive from extrapolations of current trends, especially trends of global 
environmental change and natural resource depletion (Rockström et al. 2009; Baum and 
Handoh 2014), while some projections of radical technological transformation derive 
from extrapolations of current trends, such as projections of transformative artificial 
intelligence scenarios based on the “Moore’s law” trend in computer hardware 
performance (Moravec 1998; Kurzweil 2005). It is similarly a matter of interpretation 
whether the current civilization is a continuation of the status quos that existed 1,000, 
100, or even just 20 or 30 years ago, given the many changes there have been in politics, 
culture, and technology.
For purposes of this paper, we will restrict status quo trajectories to those with no 
radical changes to the state of human civilization or its underlying trends. Status quo 
trajectories would keep important attributes of human civilization in a form that would be
broadly recognizable to current observers. (Which attributes of human civilization are 
important can be derived from ethics and related factors, as discussed in Section 2.) For 
example, a status quo trajectory could involve significant environmental degradation and 
technological advancement that combine to keep attributes such as population at a similar
size or growth rate. This conception of status quo trajectories permits some changes in 
the important attributes, but not the more extreme changes that may be possible. Some 
more extreme changes are discussed in the sections below on the other types of 
trajectories.
Near-term trajectory analyses often present a range of possible future trajectories, 
given a range of different assumptions. For example, the United Nations (2017a) offers 
probabilistic projections of population growth scenarios through 2100, with a 95% 
prediction interval range of roughly 9.5 billion to around 13.5 billion humans at that time.
Figure 2 presents three trajectories of United Nations population data for past and future 
world populations. Each of these trajectories could be considered status quo.
The above discussion uses metrics based on human attributes. Other ethical 
perspectives can point in different directions. For example, current aggregate value may 
be negative if non-human animal welfare is taken into account. The farm animal 
population is much larger than the human population; an estimated 68 billion non-human 
animals were slaughtered for food worldwide in 2012 (United Nations 2012). A 
substantial fraction of them suffer in factory farms (Mallon 2005; DeGrazia 2009), 
plausibly so much that their existence, and in turn aggregate global value, is net negative. 
Fortunately, status quo trajectories may change this, such as via “in vitro meat” that could
substitute factory farms for painless meat production (Bhat and Fayaz 2011; Post 2012). 
8 In mathematical terms, this could be the state of human civilization as shown in Figures 2-3 as well as its 
first and second derivatives with respect to time.
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For ethical views that include non-human animal welfare, this is an important 
development to track.
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Figure 2. Historical world population estimates for 1950-2015, and future population
projections out to 2100 at three prediction intervals, based on data from United Nations
(2017b; 2017c).
Over the long-term, the persistence of status quo trajectories appears rather unlikely. 
Instead, civilization is likely to either die out or transform. If nothing else, civilization 
would presumably end around a few hundred million to a few billion years from now, 
when Earth becomes uninhabitable due to the Sun becoming warmer and larger 
(O’Malley-James et al. 2014; Wolf and Toon 2015). But it would be a remarkable feat for
a status quo trajectory to persist for so long. The frequency of major extinction events in 
Earth’s history suggests that the status quo civilization is unlikely to survive for one 
billion more years. Survival into the far future may require transformative technology 
and/or astronomical expansion, which may be likely to happen eventually as long as 
catastrophe is avoided. Indeed, rapid ongoing technological and social change suggests 
that some sort of major transformation is likely to occur relatively soon. Finally, there 
have been major changes before, such as from agriculture and industrialization, which 
further suggests the possibility of future trajectory changes. As noted above, it is a matter 
of interpretation whether some of these changes push outside the status quo. Still, we find
it hard to expect any reasonable interpretation of the status quo to persist into the long-
term future. 
Perhaps we underestimate the durability of the status quo civilization. Perhaps past 
upheavals are no longer applicable. Perhaps current civilization is highly resilient to a 
range of catastrophes and/or agile at avoiding them. Perhaps radical technological 
breakthroughs and space travel will prove elusive. In that case, the status quo could hold 
for a long time. But it would seem at least as possible to overestimate the durability of the
status quo civilization, given our present vantage point from within it. Our civilization 
seems quite robust, given its current dominant position on Earth. But this perspective 
may be biased by the fact that we are within the status quo. Indeed, our status quo world 
may be less durable and more historically and environmentally contingent than it would 
seem, including our international relations (e.g., Lebow 2015), our civilization (e.g., 
Richerson et al. 2001), and our very existence (e.g., Ćirković et al. 2010). Thus, while we
cannot rule out the long-term viability of status quo trajectories, other trajectories appear 
more likely.
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4. Catastrophe Trajectories
Among catastrophe trajectories, the simplest to analyze are those involving human 
extinction. Following extinction, basic attributes including population, economic 
production, and quality of life all fall to zero.9 More complex are catastrophes that some 
people survive, but in a form that is qualitatively different from the status quo 
civilization. Analysis of these sub-extinction catastrophes requires attention to the 
prospects for humans in what could be a radically altered world, and to how readily 
survivors could rebuild some form of civilization.
Prior research has identified a number of human extinction risks, including nuclear 
war, collision between Earth and a large asteroid or comet, supervolcano eruption, global 
warming, runaway artificial intelligence, physics experiment disasters, and scenarios 
involving multiple major catastrophes (e.g., Asimov 1981; Rees 2003; Leggett 2006; 
Bostrom and Ćirković 2008; Häggström 2016). Some of these events would likely result 
in immediate human extinction if they occurred—for example, a physics experiment 
disaster could alter the astronomical vicinity, rendering life on Earth impossible (Turner 
and Wilczek 1982; Ord et al. 2010). For other events, the outcome is more ambiguous—
for example, asteroids, comets, volcanoes, and nuclear war could all block sunlight, 
decimating global agriculture, but some people may be able to survive on stored food or 
food grown from biomass or fossil fuels (Denkenberger and Pearce 2014; Baum et al. 
2015a). Tonn and MacGregor (2009) study a “singular chain of events” in which a series 
of catastrophes befall humanity; they find that, in the absence of a decisive extinction 
event, it is actually difficult to get to extinction. We find this reasoning compelling while 
noting the difficulty of assessing unprecedented catastrophe scenarios.
For sub-extinction catastrophes, the long-term trajectories depict the fate of the 
survivor populations. Will they persist for some extended time in their diminished state, 
and then die out later on? Will they rebuild something along the lines of the pre-
catastrophe, status quo civilization? Will they go on to achieve technological 
transformation and/or space colonization? The fate of survivor populations depends first 
on how they fare in the immediate aftermath of the catastrophe and then on their long-
term prospects to manage and/or rebuild civilization.
An important variable for catastrophe trajectories is the speed of the catastrophe. 
Some catastrophes could cause significant harm to human civilization in a short period of
time, such as nuclear wars or pandemics. Other catastrophes work more slowly, such as 
global warming or the depletion of certain natural resources. Slow catastrophes give 
humans more time to adapt to the new conditions, though the conditions may also be 
more durable. What follows is written mainly with fast catastrophes in mind, though 
some of the discussion may also apply to slow catastrophes. 
Figure 3 presents a variety of potential catastrophe trajectories. It distinguishes 
between catastrophes resulting in extinction, in survival with neither agriculture nor 
industry, and in survival with agriculture but not industry. Agriculture and industry are 
essential features of modern human civilization and are discussed in detail below. Figure 
3 also shows survivor populations either remaining in the post-catastrophe state, 
recovering back towards the state of the current civilization, or enduring subsequent 
catastrophes. Finally, Figure 3 shows the current civilization avoiding catastrophe and 
9 A possible exception would be if automated technology maintains economic production without human 
upkeep, though current technology is not sufficiently automated for this.
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maintaining the status quo trajectory, as well as the current civilization and two post-
catastrophe civilizations achieving technological transformation and/or astronomical 
trajectories. These are all among the possible trajectories a post-catastrophe civilization 
(or the current civilization if it avoids catastrophe) could take. As with Figure 1, these 
trajectories are for illustrative purposes only; no precision is intended. Additionally, the 
vertical axis is not labeled for the same reason as with Figure 1.
Time
Tech. Transformation
and/or Astronomical
Current
Civilization
C
at
as
tro
ph
e
Status Quo
Extinction
Survival, no Agriculture or Industry
Agriculture, no Industry Recovery of
Agriculture
Recovery
of Industry
Recovery
of Industry
C
at
as
tro
ph
e
Tech. Transformation
and/or Astronomical
Tech. Transformation
and/or Astronomical
Extinction Extinction Extinction
Figure 3. Illustrative catastrophe trajectories.
4.1 The Immediate Aftermath
In the immediate catastrophe aftermath, survivors will need to secure their basic needs, 
especially food and water. Most of the contemporary human population obtains food and 
water from civilization: they do not procure their own. This portion of the population 
could have a relatively difficult time in the immediate aftermath, though this depends on 
the functioning of civilization. If food and water provision continues, then a relatively 
large population could survive. Thus, an important question is how resilient the basic 
functioning of civilization is to major catastrophes.10 If civilization fails, the survivor 
population could consist mainly of subsistence farmers, hunters and gatherers, and other 
people who procure their own basic needs. These people are, at present, often considered 
among the world’s poorest, but post-catastrophe they may be among the best off.
Another group that could fare well is those who prepared for the catastrophe. This 
could include inhabitants of military bunkers and continuity of government facilities, 
citizen survivalists (“preppers”), and inhabitants of refuges designed for this purpose 
(Hanson 2008; Jebari 2015; Baum et al. 2015b; Turchin and Green 2017). These people 
could have ample food and water, medical supplies, and other resources needed to 
survive without civilization, as well as resources that can be used to maintain and/or 
rebuild civilization, such as seeds, tools, and information. It could also include much 
larger populations if there are large-scale catastrophe preparations. At present, most 
institutional catastrophe preparation is for smaller, more frequent catastrophes such as 
earthquakes, hurricanes, and sub-pandemic disease outbreaks. However, there are 
proposals for preparations for large-scale preparation, such as in food stockpiles or 
10 The resilience of civilization to catastrophes is explored in the field of global systemic risk (e.g., Helbing 
2013; Baum and Handoh 2014; Centeno et al. 2015).
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alternative means of food production to maintain food through catastrophes that disrupt 
traditional agriculture (Denkenberger and Pearce 2014; Baum et al. 2015a). If proposals 
along these lines are implemented, survivor populations could be much larger.
For survivor populations, the availability of appropriate information could be a 
significant factor. The contemporary population is increasingly urban and lacking in the 
knowledge of how to survive without civilization. However, contemporary civilization 
has a lot of information documented in libraries, bookstores, and online. While the 
internet may not be available post-catastrophe, many libraries and bookstores contain 
basic information about such matters as how to purify water or grow food. Some libraries
and bookstores will even have books that are specifically on the topic of how to survive 
catastrophes (e.g., Dartnell 2014; Denkenberger and Pearce 2014). If survivors can access
this information, their prospects could significantly improve.
The availability of food, water, information, and other resources can depend heavily 
on the specifics of the catastrophe. For example, some catastrophes could cause major 
disruptions to agriculture (Section 4.3). Nuclear wars are likely to destroy urban areas in 
targeted countries. Pandemics will leave built infrastructure intact, and may have limited 
effect in some areas, such as remote islands and inland areas inhabited by uncontacted 
peoples.
4.2 Successive Generations
If a population is able to survive the immediate catastrophe aftermath and the subsequent 
years of potentially turbulent conditions, then its subsequent trajectory will depend on, 
among other things, its ability to produce additional generations of people. If the initial 
survivor population is too small, or insufficiently healthy, it may fail to remain viable. 
The population would also need a suitable age and gender distribution. Note that what 
matters here is not the total worldwide survivor population, but the survivor population(s)
that are in sufficient proximity to reproduce. Small survivor populations in 
geographically distant locations, such as scattered small bunkers or survivalist camps, 
may contribute little to future generations.
In conservation biology and related fields, the concept of minimum viable population 
refers to the smallest isolated population able to survive through genetic and 
environmental changes, with high (generally greater than 90%) probability, for many 
generations into the future (Shaffer 1981:132). The probability of surviving and thriving 
increases with the size of the population. Estimates between 150 and 40,000 have been 
proposed for the minimum viable human population (Lynch et al. 1995; Impey 2015), 
though some studies argue against any fixed minimum number (Flather et al. 2011; 
2016). Some historical analysis of human genetics suggest that there was a genetic 
bottleneck of as few as 1,000 to 3,000 individuals (Harpending et al. 1998; Li and Durbin
2011; but see Sjödin et al. 2012). Isolated bands of perhaps just 70 humans may have 
originally colonized both the Americas and Polynesia (Murray-McIntosh et al. 1998; Hey
2005), suggesting a minimum viable population of roughly 100 to 500 given a favorable 
environment (Hanson 2008; Daily et al. 1993) such as a dedicated refuge for surviving 
global catastrophes (Hanson 2008; Baum et al. 2015b; Turchin and Green 2017).11 
11 It may be possible to recreate a viable human population with advanced synthetic biology technology 
following a human extinction event (Yampolskiy 2016).
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However, in an unstructured and potentially inhospitable post-catastrophe environment, 
such a population may have a low probability of long-term survival.
This research suggests that larger survivor populations are more likely to succeed, 
especially in unfavorable post-catastrophe conditions. A population that is just large 
enough for genetic viability may face other ongoing threats, such as disease, natural 
disasters, or internal strife. The corresponding trajectory could be low for a period of time
before going to zero. That period of time could involve numerous generations, just as 
small populations on small, remote islands have persisted in isolation for numerous 
generations. (Certain catastrophe scenarios, such as extreme pandemics, may leave 
survivors only on small, remote islands.) However, it is unlikely that such populations 
could avoid a terminal catastrophe for thousands or millions of years into the future, in 
contrast with a larger population. Indeed, a small survivor population could die out much 
sooner, such as due to natural disasters, resource overexploitation, internal strife, and/or 
other factors.
Alternatively, an initially small population could grow much larger. This is especially
likely if the population is on a continent, a large island, or a small island that is 
sufficiently near a continent or large island that the population can reach the larger 
landmass. Since this is where the overwhelming majority of the current human 
population resides, there is a high likelihood of survivors in these places, except perhaps 
in certain catastrophe scenarios that specifically affect the core population, such as 
extreme pandemics. If there are small survivor populations on or near continents or large 
islands, they will have an abundance of land to spread out on, making it feasible to grow 
their population to much larger numbers. However, whether the population, economy, 
and other attributes can recover to pre-catastrophe levels depends on other factors, in 
particular regarding agriculture and industry.
4.3 Agriculture
Long-term trajectories could depend heavily on whether agriculture is maintained 
through the catastrophe or whether it is redeveloped afterwards. Agriculture has played a 
central role in human civilization to date, and it is difficult to imagine post-catastrophe 
populations recovering advanced civilization without agriculture. Thus, analysis of long-
term catastrophe trajectories should consider prospects for agriculture.
A major catastrophe could significantly alter how humans obtain food. Modern 
industrial agriculture requires complex resource inputs, supply chains, and labor pools 
that could be vulnerable to a variety of large catastrophes. For example, Huff et al. (2015)
find that major food shortages could occur from pandemics that disrupt the labor supply. 
More dramatic disruptions to agriculture could come from catastrophes that send 
particulate matter into the atmosphere, including nuclear war, volcano eruption, and 
asteroid collision, which send dust into the atmosphere, lowering surface temperatures 
and reducing sunlight and precipitation over a period of years (Xia et al. 2015).
Catastrophes that disrupt industrial agriculture could see survivors obtaining food via 
other means, including temporary food stockpiles, food grown from biomass or fossil 
fuels, or hunting and gathering (Denkenberger and Pearce 2014; Baum et al. 2015a). 
Hunting and gathering could be especially viable if the human population crashes, 
leaving an abundance of naturally growing food readily available. Indeed, there is some 
evidence that at least some hunter-gathers are able to meet their basic needs with 
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relatively few hours of effort, though this is a point of debate in anthropology (e.g., Bird-
David 1992). Furthermore, hunter-gathers may be especially likely to survive some 
catastrophes, since they often are among the remote uncontacted peoples that would 
likely survive catastrophes such as pandemics. Thus, despite the dominance of agriculture
among pre-catastrophe populations, survivor populations could be hunters and gatherers.
For catastrophes that leave a larger portion of the population intact, agriculture is 
more likely to endure. Much of the large contemporary urban population has little 
firsthand experience with either agriculture or hunting/gathering, but it is accustomed to 
thinking of agriculture as a primary means of food production. Furthermore, information 
about agriculture is widely documented in libraries and bookstores, as are agriculturally 
productive species, both of which could be sought out by survivors. This cultural and 
material legacy makes the survival or rapid redevelopment of agriculture more likely.
Figure 4 presents two illustrative probability distributions of the redevelopment of 
agriculture. Each version contains three parts: boxes representing the probabilities that 
agriculture is never lost and that it is never redeveloped (x and z), and a curve showing a 
probability distribution from the time that the catastrophe occurs to the time the survivor 
population dies (ya and yb). Each version shows it being most likely that agriculture is 
lost and later recovered and least likely that the survivor population dies without 
recovering agriculture (i.e., z < x < ya|yb). Figure 4a shows the survivor population being
most likely to recover agriculture shortly after the catastrophe and successively less likely
to recover agriculture as time goes by, whereas Figure 4b shows the opposite. Figure 4 is 
presented for illustration only and should not be treated as a best-guess probability 
distribution estimate. For example, a best-guess would probably not show the yb curve as
the mirror image of the ya curve: instead of having the same curvature, it would likely 
have a more gradual curvature.
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Figure 4. Illustrative probability distributions of post-catastrophe agriculture. The
area x is the probability agriculture is never lost; ya and yb are the probability it is lost
and redeveloped; and z is the probability it is lost and never redeveloped. The curves at
ya and yb show the probability per unit time of agriculture being redeveloped.
A variety of factors can inform the crafting of agriculture redevelopment probability 
distributions along the lines of Figure 4. Some of these point to it being more likely that 
agriculture would be redeveloped sooner, as in Figure 4a. The first post-catastrophe 
generations would benefit from strong cultural memories of agriculture, including how it 
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works and the fact that it can produce lots of food. This could lead them to seek to 
redevelop agriculture and could also facilitate their success. Furthermore, they may have 
access to important crop and livestock species. These species were developed over 
thousands of years to maximize productivity and nutritional value, and in this regard are 
much better than the ancient varieties. Some more recent varieties, such as RoundUp 
Ready® crops designed to resist a chemical herbicide, may fail to produce significant 
yields in the absence of modern agriculture, but heirloom varieties would still be 
considerably more productive than what was available to early humans. These species 
would likely be more available immediately following the catastrophe; as time goes by, 
absent human intervention, they may die out or be lost. The availability of grains may be 
particularly important. Because grains are suitable for long-term storage and 
transportation, they are easily taxed and thus support the formation of states. Fortunately, 
modern grains are widely available across all major world regions.
On the other hand, immediately following the catastrophe, agricultural land may be 
damaged from salination, topsoil depletion, and other effects of modern industrial 
agriculture. Accessible mineral reserves of phosphorus, a crucial fertilizer, will also be 
largely depleted (Cordell and White 2011). These conditions would gradually improve 
over time, improving agriculture prospects for later post-catastrophe generations. If these 
factors dominate, then the probability distribution for redeveloping agriculture may look 
more like Figure 4b.
If agriculture does not quickly recover, then prospects for agriculture could depend on
fluctuations in Earth’s climate. Over the past million years, the climate has fluctuated 
between cold (glacial) and warm (interglacial) periods, with interglacials occurring every 
~100,000 years and lasting for ~15,000 years (Archer 2008).12 Earth is currently in an 
interglacial, the Holocene, which began ~10,000 years ago; the previous interglacial, the 
Eemian, spanned from ~130,000 to ~115,000 years ago (Dahl-Jensen et al. 2013). The 
rise of agriculture—and the civilization it permits—coincide with the Holocene 
interglacial, i.e. the last 10,000 years. This may not be a coincidence: the favorable 
Holocene climate may have been a prerequisite for the development of agriculture 
(Richerson et al. 2001). 
The Holocene’s warm climate alone may not have been sufficient. Ice core data 
suggest that the Holocene has a relatively stable climate compared to previous 
interglacials (e.g., Petit et al. 1999). Meanwhile, archaeological evidence suggests that 
the human lineage has had similar cognitive capabilities for ~250,000-300,000 years 
(McBrearty and Brooks 2000; McBrearty 2013). This suggests that agriculture can only 
plausibly be developed during some interglacials. As a rough starting estimate, the 
historical data suggest one third of interglacials are suitable, since three interglacials have
occurred in the last 300,000 years, but these data are too sparse to produce reliable 
conclusions.
Early post-catastrophe climates will differ from early Holocene conditions in one 
important respect: heightened atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. Climate 
models project anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions to extend the current interglacial 
for ~30,000 to ~500,000 years (Archer and Ganopolski 2005; Herrero et al. 2014). This 
does not necessarily make the early redevelopment of agriculture more likely, because 
12 Patterns with frequencies of ~41,000 years and ~23,000 years are also observed; see e.g. Haqq-Misra 
(2014).
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emissions are making Earth’s climate substantially different than in the early Holocene. 
Indeed, a warmer world could pose substantial risks to survivor populations, including 
through ecological changes such as desertification, or greater viability of certain diseases.
However, post-catastrophe emissions would presumably be minimal, causing climates to 
gradually cool.13 At some point in the future, before the next glacial period, the survivor 
population may experience conditions similar to the early Holocene—though perhaps not
with the same stability.
Taking these various factors into account, we tentatively estimate agriculture 
probabilities as shown in Figure 5. Figure 5 is shown as a hand-drawn sketch to 
emphasize our tentativeness. Figure 5 shows a substantial probability of agriculture not 
being lost (box x) and a much smaller probability of it never being redeveloped (box z). It
further shows some probability of agriculture being quickly redeveloped (the far-left peak
of the curve above y). The probability per unit time of the redevelopment of agriculture 
then quickly falls as survivors struggle under heightened atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations. The probability per unit time rises again as climates return to something 
similar to the early Holocene. Finally, the probability per unit time begins an oscillatory 
pattern corresponding to glacial-interglacial cycles. Figure 5 shows this pattern extending
into the indefinite future; in practice, the pattern would eventually fade as Earth shifts 
into new climate regimes, as caused by the warming and expanding Sun (on time scales 
of hundreds of millions of years), if not sooner.
Time
x
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Figure 5. Tentative probability distribution of post-catastrophe agriculture. The area
x is the probability agriculture is never lost; y is the probability it is lost and redeveloped;
and z is the probability it is lost and never redeveloped. The curve at y shows the
probability per unit time of agriculture being redeveloped.
Figure 5 is hardly the only way to plot probabilities of rediscovering agriculture. 
Indeed, the probabilities depend on several factors, including the catastrophe scenario 
(including the severity of the catastrophe and the geographic distribution of survivors), 
pre-disaster preparations, and future greenhouse gas emissions. Likewise, current (pre-
catastrophe) civilization can improve prospects in several ways. One is to avoid 
13 Under most scenarios, there will be some post-catastrophe emissions. For example, carbon dioxide and 
methane are being released from thawing permafrost (Schuur et al. 2015); this process will continue due to 
thermal inertia in the climate system unless the catastrophe causes significant ongoing cooling. However, 
this effect is small relative to the effects from anthropogenic emissions. There may be some scenarios in 
which the effect is larger, such as scenarios that release the large reservoirs of undersea methane clathrates 
(on which, see e.g. Buffett and Archer 2004), though these scenarios are less typical.
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catastrophes that would be especially disruptive to agriculture, thereby increasing x. 
Another is to prepare for the redevelopment of agriculture, such as by preserving 
heirloom agricultural species, thereby increasing y, especially in early post-catastrophe 
years. Current civilization can also affect the prospects for redeveloping agriculture by 
increasing or reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However, the net effect of emissions on
the probability of redeveloping agriculture is unclear.
4.4 From Agriculture to Industry
In addition to agriculture, modern civilization also depends heavily on industry, as do 
prospects for technological transformation and space colonization. The current human 
civilization developed industry after agriculture, and for good reason: agriculture enables 
the food surplus needed to develop and work in industry. Likewise, a catastrophe that 
loses agriculture would likely also lose industry, and industry would only be redeveloped 
after agriculture, whereas a catastrophe that loses industry would not necessarily also lose
agriculture. Long-term catastrophe trajectories will thus depend on whether industry is 
maintained through the catastrophe or whether it is redeveloped afterwards, for which 
probabilities could be drawn analogously to those in Figure 4.
The short time—just a few thousand years—between the development of agriculture 
and the development of industry may suggest that if agriculture redevelops, industry is 
likely to soon follow. 
However, there are reasons to be skeptical of this. First, there is only one data point 
available: industry developed only once, in Britain, and then spread around the world.14 
One data point does not make for reliable analysis: perhaps typical periods from 
agriculture to industry are much larger or much smaller than a few thousand years. 
Second, the historical path from agriculture to industry was circuitous. The Chinese, 
Greeks, Indians, and Romans were all intellectually advanced agricultural civilizations 
with large trading networks, but they never developed industry. This suggests that the 
development of industry could have been less of an inevitability and more of a historical 
coincidence.
Histories of the industrial revolution offer several explanations. Allen (2009) 
emphasizes the importance of Britain having expensive labor yet inexpensive energy and 
financial capital, which combined to stimulate the invention and spread of industrial 
technologies. Mokyr (2009) emphasizes the Enlightenment and scientific revolution, the 
fruits of which fed entrepreneurs who were empowered by Britain’s institutional 
structure. Crafts (2010) proposes that both sets of factors may have been important. If the
previous industrial revolution was indeed contingent on a long list of factors, prospects 
for the post-catastrophe redevelopment of industry may be poor, because it is relatively 
unlikely that a multitude of factors would be present concurrently within a survivor 
population.
Survivor populations would face substantially different resource availabilities. Some 
of the historical ‘low-hanging fruit’ will no longer be available. For example, the 
cheapest and most accessible fossil fuels have already been burned; if these were crucial 
for Britain’s industrial revolution, then post-catastrophe industry may be technologically 
or economically infeasible. Similarly, the cheapest and most accessible deposits of metal 
14 The fact that industry only developed once may not mean much if it spreads so quickly that multiple 
independent developments of industry are unlikely.
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ores have also been extracted. These factors all suggest a lower probability for the 
recovery of industry.
Other factors point in the opposite direction. For energy, wind and hydro will be 
available and are relatively easy to tap. Hydro power in particular has a high energy 
return on investment, at least under modern conditions (Hall et al. 2014), and has a large 
global energy production potential (Zhou et al. 2015), making it a promising energy 
source for recovering industry. Additionally, while major metal deposits will be depleted,
these metals themselves will still be present. Indeed, much of the metal has been 
processed into more usable forms (e.g., steel instead of iron ore) and is concentrated in 
cities and landfills, the ruins of which could be a good site for post-catastrophe mining. 
Some of these materials may not be readily usable, such as damaged plastics or certain 
metals. For instance, even medieval European forges, which lacked bellow systems, were
unable to reach temperatures sufficient to melt iron. Nonetheless, some materials are 
likely to be usable. And if nothing else, the ruins of industry could provide an enduring 
proof-of-concept and inspiration to redevelop industry.
Given the different conditions faced by survivor populations, it is likely that any 
civilization that reemerges post-catastrophe would be different from the current one. If 
resource depletion is the dominant factor, then successive civilizations would tend to be 
smaller. Alternatively, if the persistent accumulation of knowledge, concentration of 
metals and other resources in cities, and optimization of agricultural species is the 
dominant factor, then successive civilizations would tend to be larger. Our present 
expectation is that successive civilizations will tend to be smaller, due mainly to the 
depletion of fossil fuels, but we caution that conclusions on this matter cannot be made 
with confidence at this time.
It is more difficult to project post-catastrophe labor, intellectual, and economic 
conditions. The catastrophe could decimate the labor supply, but it could do the same for 
labor demand, with an unclear net effect on the cost of labor. Early post-catastrophe 
populations may retain some Enlightenment and scientific intellectual tendencies, though 
this is less likely if survivors hail mainly from pre-catastrophe populations of hunter-
gatherers and subsistence farmers. Alternatively, survivors could view industry as a cause
of the catastrophe and therefore something to be rejected. If industry is not redeveloped 
within the first few post-catastrophe generations—for example, if it must wait until a 
future interglacial period—then these social conditions become especially opaque.
Taking these various factors into account, we tentatively estimate industry 
probabilities as shown in Figure 6. Figure 6 specifically shows the probability 
distribution of the recovery of industry at different times given the presence of 
agriculture. It shows a relatively small probability that industry will not be lost (x), 
corresponding to catastrophe scenarios in which neither agriculture nor industry are lost. 
It shows comparable probabilities for industry being or not being recovered, given its loss
(y and z). The large z (especially compared to z in Figure 5) is due to the possible 
historical contingency of the British industrial revolution, as well as the possible narrow 
time window for industry to redevelop (a few thousand years during interglacials). 
Finally, Figure 6 shows that industry is likely to be redeveloped sooner after the 
catastrophe occurs (the curvature of y), due to the social and intellectual advantages that 
may be retained by the survivor population immediately following the catastrophe.
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Figure 6. Tentative probability distribution of post-catastrophe industry. The area x is
the probability industry is never lost; y is the probability it is lost and redeveloped; and z
is the probability it is lost and never redeveloped. The curve at y shows the probability
per unit time of industry being redeveloped.
5. Sketches of Technological Transformation and Astronomical Trajectories
A hallmark of technological transformation and astronomical trajectories is that they 
could both enable rapid expansion of human civilization. (Technological transformation 
could also lead to catastrophe.) The corresponding trajectories may be similar for both 
technological transformation and astronomical trajectories and are thus worth considering
together before diving into the details of each type of trajectory.
Figure 7 presents several possible trajectories. Each trajectory begins with 
exponential growth and then goes on a different path. There are two sets of trajectories, 
one of which lags the other. The leading trajectory shows 2t during the exponential 
growth phase, while the lagging trajectory shows 2t-n, with t denoting time and n being an 
arbitrary finite positive number. The lagging trajectory thus shows delayed technological 
transformation or space colonization. Figure 7a shows exponential growth continuing 
indefinitely. Figure 7b shows exponential growth continuing until some fixed size limit is
reached, which could be some sort of carrying capacity. Figure 7c shows exponential 
growth continuing until some fixed point in time is reached. Finally, Figure 7d shows 
exponential growth continuing until some fixed point in time is reached, at which point 
civilization crashes. A delay in technological transformation or space colonization results 
in a long-term reduction in the trajectory in all cases except 7b.
These are not the only possible trajectories. For example, growth could follow a non-
exponential curve, or it could taper off gradually, such as in a logistic curve. Trajectories 
could also oscillate, similar to the rises and falls of civilization in catastrophe and 
recovery trajectories. Or, trajectories could combine elements from multiple curve types, 
for example if civilization stops growing as in (b) or (c), and then crashes as in (d), or if 
civilization branches into different populations with different trajectories. Figure 7 is not 
intended to be exhaustive, only illustrative of some important possible types of 
trajectories.
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Figure 7. Illustrative technological transformation and astronomical trajectories,
including baseline and delayed (by n units of time) exponential growth trajectories for
four trajectory types.
6. Technological Transformation Trajectories
Human civilization is currently going through a period of rapid technological change. 
The status quo trajectory is likely to bring much technological progress. Because of this, 
it can be difficult to distinguish between status quo and technological transformation 
trajectories: the status quo trajectory would seem to be one of at least some technological 
transformation. However, for the technological transformation trajectories, we have in 
mind an even more profound set of technologies that, if developed, would put human 
civilization in a fundamentally different place than what may be reached via status quo 
trajectories. These technologies are often associated with the concept of “technological 
singularity” because they portend a state change in human civilization (Sandberg 2010). 
The change can be good or bad, depending on the details of what precisely happens, and 
depending on one’s ethical perspective. Indeed, compared to status quo and catastrophe 
trajectories, the evaluation of technological transformation trajectories can be especially 
sensitive to subtle differences in ethics.
To illustrate technological transformation, this section describes several classes of 
potential breakthrough technology: nanotechnology, biotechnology, and artificial 
intelligence. These are not necessarily the only potential breakthrough technologies, but 
they are among the most widely discussed and perhaps also the most plausible. We 
review these technologies to convey a sense of the transformation that may be possible 
and then analyze implications for long-term trajectories. The discussion focuses on 
trajectories involving technological catastrophe or positive outcomes on Earth; positive 
outcomes in outer space are discussed in section 7 on astronomical trajectories.
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6.1 Nanotechnology
Nanotechnology refers broadly to technology with nanometer-scale components. 
Nanotechnology is in increasingly wide use with applications in many areas including 
sunscreens, textiles, and medicine. It is an important area of technology but not 
particularly transformative. The form of nanotechnology that, if built, is more likely to be
transformative, is known as atomically precise manufacturing (APM), which is the 
assembly of materials with atomic precision. While some doubt the feasibility of APM 
(Smalley 2001), proof-of-principle can be found in certain biomolecules, such as 
ribosomes (Freitas and Merkle 2004), and scanning tunneling microscopes, which can 
perform rudimentary APM (Møller et al. 2017).
If full development of APM is achieved, it could bring a dramatic transformation in 
human civilization’s ability to manufacture a wide range of products. Drexler (2013) 
terms this “radical abundance”, as APM could help eliminate major problems in the fields
of food security, treatable diseases, clean energy, and global warming (via clean energy 
and the manufacture of devices to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere15). APM 
could also cause problems, such as via enhanced production of weaponry, though this 
depends on which weapons are built and how they are used. Finally, APM could greatly 
facilitate space travel, enabling astronomical trajectories, such as by improving the cost 
and performance of spaceship materials (Drexler 2013).
6.2 Biotechnology
Biotechnology is another sector that is already large yet still only scratching the surface 
of its transformative potential. Biotechnology is used heavily for livestock and crop 
plants, a practice that dates to the early days of agriculture or even earlier, and continues 
to this day with increasing sophistication. Perhaps the biotechnology application with the 
most transformative potential is in the modification or “enhancement” of human nature. 
Biotechnology is already in use in such things as cochlear implants, which enable the 
deaf to hear, and in pharmaceutical cognitive stimulants such as modafinil. Future 
biotechnologies could turn humans into something much more physically and cognitively
capable (Bostrom and Sandberg 2009). In doing so, it could transform human civilization
into a civilization of one or more new types of beings that can substantially outperform 
humans in many ways.
6.3 Artificial Intelligence
At the time of this writing, AI is going through a renaissance, with machine learning 
algorithms powering advances in many sectors including transportation, medicine, 
finance, military (Maas et al. 2017), and much more. However, current AI is modest in 
comparison to some expectations of future AI. In particular, it has been proposed that AI 
could eventually surpass humanity in important respects, with transformative 
consequences (Miller 2012; Bostrom 2014; Hanson 2016; Sotala 2017). Such AI could be
superintelligent, with much-greater-than-human intellectual capacity, and/or 
superpowerful, with much-greater-than-human capacity to effect change in the world. 
Depending on the details of its design, such AI could be transformative for human 
civilization by solving many of its problems, creating massive new opportunities, or, 
15 For more on carbon dioxide removal, see e.g. Lackner et al. (2012); Tavoni and Socolow (2013).
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alternatively, by causing mass destruction (Miller 2012; Bostrom 2014; Sotala and 
Yampolskiy 2015; Yampolskiy 2015).
6.4 Combinations of Technologies
Nanotechnology, biotechnology, and AI could combine in transformative ways (Eth 
2017). Nanotechnology could transform the production of biotechnology, enabling mass 
adoption of transformative biotechnologies. Biotechnology might facilitate the 
development of detailed ‘brain emulations’ which accurately simulate human beings, 
creating one form of AI (Hanson 2016). In turn, AI could facilitate the development of 
nanotechnology and biotechnology. The AI-biotechnology intersection also includes the 
prospect of mind uploading, in which human minds are ‘uploaded’ into digital computers,
enabling a radically different form of human civilization. Other technologies may also 
play major roles. Our brief discussion of possible technologies is not intended to be a 
comprehensive overview—it is intended simply as an overview of the sorts of ways in 
which technology could transform human civilization.
6.5 Technological Catastrophe Trajectories
The aforementioned technologies could result in several types of trajectories. They could 
cause catastrophe, such as by nanotechnology being used to mass produce major 
weaponry, biotechnology being used to engineer deadly pathogens, or AI getting out of 
control and harming people. Catastrophes from transformative technologies could be 
considerably more severe than their counterparts involving natural processes or regular 
technologies: nanotechnology could enable larger wars, biotechnology could enable more
severe pathogens, and highly capable AIs could produce uncontrollable disasters. Thus, 
catastrophes from transformative technologies appear more likely to cause extinction or 
the loss of agriculture and/or industry. However, for catastrophes of a given severity, the 
trajectories themselves are likely to be broadly similar regardless of whether the 
catastrophe is caused by transformative technology or something else.
There is one exception: trajectories involving negative value. Some attributes of 
human civilization cannot be negative, including population and certain measures of 
economic production.16 Others, however, potentially can be. An important one is 
subjective experience or quality of life. For a given person, subjective experience is 
negative when, all else equal, they would rather be unconscious—not have any 
experience at all.17 This occurs, for example, in medical situations in which anesthetics 
are used. If a person’s aggregate life experience is negative, that person would arguably 
16 An example of a measure of economic production that cannot be negative is the amount of money spent 
on goods and services—people cannot spend negative amounts of money. This measure is seen, for 
example, in the International Monetary Fund’s definition of gross domestic product as “the monetary value 
of final goods and services—that is, those that are bought by the final user—produced in a country in a 
given period of time” (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/gdp.htm). Other measures of 
economic production can be negative, for example when it is measured relative to initial resource inputs, in 
which case economic production could produce something less valuable than the initial inputs.
17 More precisely, subjective experience is negative when a person would evaluate that experience as being 
worse than the absence of experience, with both being evaluated on their own and not in the context of 
broader circumstances. There are circumstances in which a person may prefer to have a negative 
experience. For example, a person may prefer to remain conscious during an extreme emergency, such as a 
battlefield injury, in order to survive and persevere, even though that would mean enduring great pain.
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(depending on one’s ethical perspective) be better off not living, and euthanasia may be 
an appropriate option.18
Fortunately, the current human population would only benefit from anesthesia or 
euthanasia in uncommon circumstances. The aggregate subjective experience across the 
total population would appear to be decidedly positive. Furthermore, it is unlikely that 
this would change under a wide range of status quo trajectories. Even if the status quo 
changes for the worse, human psychology has considerable adaptive capacity. Thus, 
studies of subjective wellbeing find that humans are able to maintain a reasonable quality 
of life even in seemingly bleak circumstances, such as prostitutes in the slums of Calcutta
(Biswas-Diener and Diener 2001).19
Transformative technologies could bring negative aggregate human subjective 
experience (Sotala and Gloor 2017). This could occur, for example, by empowering 
someone or something to push human lives in unbearable ways, such as via mass 
enslavement or sadism. If transformative technologies are controlled by a small portion 
of the human population, then they could seek their own benefit to the detriment of 
everyone else. Alternatively, if autonomous technologies themselves gain control, then 
they could inflict massive harm. For example, some have worried that an AI designed to 
improve subjective experience could inadvertently do the opposite, due to subtleties of 
human psychology that are hard to explain to AI (e.g., Muehlhauser and Helm 2012). If 
the aggregate would be net negative, then the corresponding trajectory would appear as in
Figure 7, except flipped vertically, with negative values instead of positive values on the 
vertical axis.
Alternatively, transformative technologies could massively improve conditions. They 
could reduce or even eliminate poverty, disease, environmental degradation, and other 
major challenges, resulting in excellent versions of status quo trajectories. Transformative
technologies could also bring advances that go well beyond the status quo. Some of these 
involve space colonization, which is discussed further below. However, even just on 
Earth, much is possible. For example, if human minds are uploaded into computers, they 
could experience what to them feels like thousands of years in just a few years of 
conventional calendar time (Hanson 2016).20 Alternatively, and perhaps even more 
controversially, it may be possible for transformative technology to outright replace 
humanity with something superior, thereby bringing a massive improvement to the 
aggregate value on Earth. Thus, even without space colonization, transformative 
technology could bring a much-greater-than-status quo trajectory.
Still, over the long-term, any civilization that is only on Earth will presumably have 
certain limits. Earth is limited in volume, in the mass and atomic distribution of available 
matter, in the quantity of incoming solar radiation, and in its inhabitable lifetime.21 Thus, 
18 The concept of negative subjective experience is commonly discussed in the context of negative 
utilitarianism and related ethical frameworks (e.g., Smart 1958; Griffin 1979; Benatar 2006; Baum 2008).
19 A possible exception is for populations under highly repressive regimes, especially totalitarian and 
genocidal regimes, which may create negative subjective wellbeing at larger scales. Additionally, as 
discussed in Section 4, the total current value may be negative if non-human animal welfare is also 
accounted for.
20 Of course, thousands of experienced years of negative subjective welfare would be a massive loss, not a 
massive improvement. The possibility of mind uploading heightens the importance of ensuring positive 
welfare.
21 These parameters may differ from those considered for near-term limits to growth without technological 
transformation. Nonetheless, they appear to provide strict upper limits for what a more advanced 
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without space colonization, the long-term trajectory could grow to high levels, though not
as high as is possible in astronomical trajectories, and it would go to zero when Earth 
becomes uninhabitable. Furthermore, it would go to zero at a similar time as status quo 
trajectories, if both trajectories make it that long. While a civilization with technological 
transformation may survive somewhat longer, presumably it would die out as the Sun 
becomes so large that it engulfs the planet. Thus, without space colonization, 
technological trajectories would likely look something like Figure 7b, except with an 
eventual decline to zero, as in Figure 7d. Therefore, we should expect the largest and 
most long-lasting civilizations to come from space colonization.
7. Astronomical Trajectories
The status quo human civilization has already done some basic space exploration, and 
there is active discussion of establishing permanent colonies on extraterrestrial bodies, 
especially on Mars.22 However, these space missions are dependent on human civilization
on Earth, and likewise are quite small relative to the rest of human civilization. If 
missions like these will continue to characterize human activity in outer space, then they 
will have minimal effect on the long-term trajectory of human civilization. In particular, 
the missions will not significantly increase the total size of human civilization, nor will 
they increase civilization’s longevity. As long as they are dependent on Earth, when 
Earth civilization eventually dies out, so too will they.
Self-sufficient space colonies could persist for longer. The simplest of these would be
self-sufficient versions of the current proposals for small colonies. Perhaps the colonies 
will be dependent on Earth at first, but gradually become self-sufficient. In that case, they
may be able to survive beyond Earth’s inhabitable lifetime if they are located further than
Earth from the Sun, such as on Mars or certain large moons such as Ganymede or 
Callisto, or around other stars. If there are only a few such colonies, and if they are of the 
small size of the colonies currently being proposed, then they would amount to a small 
tail at the end of the overall long-term trajectory.
The astronomical opportunity greatly increases if colonies can expand themselves on 
their respective extraterrestrial bodies, just as human civilization has expanded on Earth.23
This could come, for example, via terraforming, in which habitable atmospheres are 
engineered on extraterrestrial bodies, and then expanding from small, primarily indoor 
colonies to outdoor habitation across the entire celestial body. Alternatively, if human 
minds have been uploaded into digital computers or replaced by AI, then terraforming 
may be unnecessary for forming large extraterrestrial colonies. In either case, such 
colonies could come to rival Earth in size, multiplying the size of human civilization by 
(approximately) the number of colonies.
If extrasolar bodies can be reached, the number of colonies could be quite large. 
Recent exoplanets research estimates 22% of Sun-like stars have Earth-like planets 
(Petigura et al. 2013), which would mean that the galaxy contains billions to tens of 
billions of planets that humans could colonize. If human civilization is in digital instead 
technological civilization can do on (or with) Earth.
22 An example of such discussion is the Mars One project, though this project has also been criticized (Do 
et al. 2016).
23 This sort of advanced spacefaring capacity could also increase the resilience of human civilization—for 
example, by enabling engineering at astronomical scales, which can increase resilience to cosmic 
explosions such as supernovae and gamma ray bursts (Ćirković and Vukotić 2016).
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of biological form, then the opportunity increases even further. Even if only a small 
fraction of these planets are reached, human civilization could grow much larger.24
This raises the question of how civilization would reach so many destinations. The 
simplest approach is for humanity to send missions from Earth to each destination. 
However, with so many destinations, this could strain Earth’s resources. A more viable 
approach would be for colonies to self-replicate, with early colonies launching additional 
colonies as human civilization gradually spreads out across the cosmos. Indeed, using 
self-replicating tools could enable space colonization at even intergalactic scales 
(Armstrong and Sandberg 2013).
The resulting growth pattern may approximate an exponential trajectory, with each 
colony producing new colonies at some rate. Indeed, prior studies of the hypothetical 
growth of civilizations in the galaxy have often assumed exponential growth. This 
assumption is central to the Fermi paradox: if extraterrestrial civilizations expanded 
exponentially, humans are likely to have observed them. Perhaps there are no 
extraterrestrial civilizations, in which case it may be feasible for human civilization to 
expand exponentially. Or perhaps they could not sustain exponential growth at galactic 
scales, in which case human civilization may also not expand so rapidly across the 
cosmos (Haqq-Misra and Baum 2009).25
There is a geometric reason to expect astronomical expansion at a less-than-
exponential trajectory. First, assume that civilization has already maximized value per 
unit volume, which seems plausible for a civilization that is sufficiently advanced to be 
able to spread across the cosmos. Second, assume that the civilization is expanding at the 
maximum possible rate, which may be the speed of light or some other rate given its 
capacity for expansion. Given that the civilization starts from a small point in space 
(Earth in the case of human civilization, Earth being a small point in space relative to the 
rest of the cosmos), the size of civilization would be at most a sphere whose radius 
increases at the above-mentioned maximum possible rate. With fixed value per volume, 
this implies that the value of civilization is increasing at a cubic rate, noting that the 
volume of a sphere is (4/3)πr3.
But suppose that human civilization manages to grow exponentially across the 
cosmos. What happens next? Some of the possibilities are sketched in Figure 7. 
(Analogous sketches can be made for growth at cubic or other rates.) In astronomical 
terms, 7a would be if expansion across the cosmos never slows; 7b would be if a carrying
capacity is reached, such as if civilization reaches all the habitable planets in the galaxy 
or all the habitable galaxies in the universe and can expand no further; 7c would be if 
there is a time when expansion cannot continue, such as if the expansion of the universe 
ensures some galaxies are pushed too far apart for civilization to reach any more of them;
and 7d would be if space colonies fail at some time, such as if the cosmos becomes 
uninhabitable due to proton decay, heat death, or some other long-term physical process.
Current understanding of the cosmos suggests that 7d, or a variant of 7d, is most 
likely: it is unlikely that civilization can persist in the cosmos indefinitely. For example, it
is expected that, in about 1014 years, all stars will stop shining, and in about 1036 years, 
24 Still further opportunity could come from constructing “Dyson swarms” around stars to collect most of 
their radiation (e.g., Armstrong and Sandberg 2013).
25 Although for a counter-argument, which suggests that a colonization project for the reachable universe 
would be a relatively simple task for a star-spanning civilization of a given level, see Armstrong and 
Sandberg (2013).
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proton decay will end matter in its current form (Adams 2008). This is a large but 
ultimately finite duration. It has been proposed that civilization may be able to move to 
other universes (Kaku 2005), in which case indefinite survival may be possible, but this 
physics is speculative and appears unlikely, given what is currently known.
Supposing that human civilization will eventually end, this leaves the question of 
what may happen in the interim. It is likely that interim trajectories will look broadly 
similar to 7b for at least an interior geographic core of the civilization. This is because 
any given finite region of the cosmos presumably has some finite carrying capacity for 
human civilization, and that an exponentially expanding civilization is likely to reach that
carrying capacity long before the region becomes uninhabitable, prompting a crash as in 
7d.
After a region’s carrying capacity is reached, the trajectory will not necessarily 
stabilize. The trajectory could decline due to resource depletion and/or competition 
between populations. Competition on astronomical scales could be analogous to 
competition between nations or other geographic regions on Earth, potentially pitting 
planets or star systems against each other; the latter could result in actual star wars.26 
Whereas in the initial growth of civilization, newly colonized regions would lack 
competition and thus could be developed for the sole benefit of the colonizing population,
in later times, the emergence of competition could cause populations to divert resources 
to defense and conquest, thereby reducing the total size of civilization. The magnitude of 
the reduction could depend on factors such as the viability of conquest at astronomical 
scales and the capacity of astronomical scale civilization to endure attack.
At the geographic outskirts of civilization, the trajectory could look more like 7a or 
7b. 7a would persist if colonization is slow relative to the size of the accessible cosmos, 
such that human civilization never fills up the entire region that it potentially could. In 
this case, the total long-term trajectory would look like 7d.
Finally, it should be noted that space colonization could be net negative according to 
some metrics (Sotala and Gloor 2017). Space colonization could expand net negatives on 
Earth achieved via technological transformation (Section 6.5). Alternatively, space 
colonization could bring net negatives even when conditions on Earth are net positive. 
Outer space is a less hospitable environment than Earth, which could make net negatives 
more likely. It is further conceivable that the outer space environment may be conducive 
to oppressive regimes and/or violent conflict that also yield net negatives. As with 
technological transformation, if space colonization would bring net negatives, then the 
trajectories would look like those in Figure 7, except flipped vertically.
8. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has presented a range of ethical and empirical aspects of the long-term 
trajectories of human civilization. This is in contrast with most prior research, which 
focuses on near-term trajectories, perhaps due to a mix of ethical favoritism for the near-
term and scientific reluctance to take on the seemingly more speculative nature of long-
term trajectories. In this paper, we hope to have shown that the long-term trajectory is 
both an important topic and one on which intelligent things can be said. We also hope to 
26 The astronomical distances involved here make this situation not exactly analogous to competition on 
Earth. For example, communication is much slower at distances of light years or more, which precludes 
certain types of military tactics.
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have produced some basic findings about long-term trajectories and demonstrated the 
sorts of research that can advance the topic.
One basic finding is that the status quo human civilization appears unlikely to persist 
over the long-term. Instead, it is likely to either end catastrophically or expand 
dramatically. Over the very long term, it appears likely that human civilization will cease 
to exist. However, it may be a very long time until that happens, especially if civilization 
colonizes space and of course only if it avoids the near-term threats to human extinction. 
In the meantime, civilization could follow a wide range of trajectories, from mere 
survival without agriculture or industry to extensive colonization of the cosmos.
Which of these trajectories will occur can be important for contemporary decision 
making. For example, recall the five potential claims about contemporary decision 
making introduced in the Section 2 discussion of time-neutral total utilitarianism:
(A) Current decisions should prioritize reducing the risk of human extinction, because 
extinction would result in the loss of all future generations.
(B) Current decisions should prioritize reducing the risk of major catastrophes that would
lead to the permanent loss of advanced human civilization.
(C) Current decisions should prioritize expediting technological breakthroughs and 
ensuring that they would improve welfare.
(D) Current decisions should prioritize expediting space colonization and ensuring that it 
would improve welfare.
(E) Current decisions should prioritize improving near-term welfare, because long-term 
trajectories will be the same either way.
Given a time-neutral total utilitarianism ethical framework, these claims can be 
evaluated in terms of the effect that contemporary decisions have on long-term 
trajectories. In light of this paper’s analysis, the following can be said about the sorts of 
circumstances in which each claim would hold:
(A) There are risks to human extinction that contemporary decisions can affect, and risks 
of sub-extinction catastrophes would not affect the long-term trajectory of human 
civilization. Sub-extinction catastrophes would have no long-term effect if they 
would cause no delay in space colonization, which is unlikely, or if delays in space 
colonization would have no effect on long-term trajectories.
(B) There are risks to the loss of advanced human civilization that contemporary 
decisions can affect, and survivors of such catastrophes are unlikely to recover 
advanced civilization.
(C) There are opportunities to influence technological breakthroughs.
(D) There are opportunities to influence space colonization.
(E) There are no significant opportunities to affect major catastrophes, technological 
breakthroughs, or space colonization.
The finding that status quo trajectories are unlikely to persist could suggest that claim 
(E) is false. If human civilization will end up in some non-status quo trajectory, then 
perhaps there are opportunities to affect this trajectory. This is not necessarily the case: 
human civilization may end up in a certain non-status quo trajectory regardless of what 
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actions are currently taken. For example, perhaps a looming catastrophe will destroy 
civilization, and there is nothing that anyone can do about it. However, we do not believe 
this to be the case. We see a wide range of opportunities in particular to affect some 
combination of catastrophic risks, potentially transformative technologies, and space 
colonization. Which opportunities are best to pursue will depend on both ethical factors 
and the specifics of the opportunities available to different people.
Within the context of catastrophic risks, we can compare claims (A) and (B). A 
number of catastrophic risks may not result in immediate extinction. This paper’s 
analysis suggests attention to several factors, in particular the post-catastrophe retention 
or recovery of agriculture and industry, as well as the long-term significance of delays in 
space colonization. Though tentative, the analysis finds that the success of post-
catastrophe human civilization is not guaranteed, with the recovery of industry being a 
particularly strong impediment. Catastrophe recovery would likely induce delays in space
colonization, which could cause long-term trajectory declines. These findings suggest 
that claim (A) may be false and claim (B) may be true. In other words, contrary to some 
claims in the catastrophic risk literature, extinction risks may not be categorically more 
important than large sub-extinction risks. Whether a particular opportunity to reduce an 
extinction risk is better than a particular opportunity to reduce a large sub-extinction risk 
will depend on the particulars of the opportunities as well as the relative long-term 
trajectories.
Likewise, the relative importance of opportunities to reduce catastrophic risks, 
develop transformative technologies, and launch space missions also depends on a 
number of particulars. One important variable is timing. For example, if technological 
breakthroughs or space colonization will occur relatively quickly, this can diminish the 
importance of many potential catastrophe scenarios, especially where the technologies or 
space colonies can mitigate the catastrophic risk. Alternatively, an early catastrophe 
could preclude the development of transformative technology or the launch of space 
colonies. Additionally, transformative technology may greatly facilitate space 
colonization, and may be worth pursuing prior to extensive efforts to colonize space. 
Some of these events could play out on relatively near-term time scales, making them 
especially important to track and pursue opportunities to influence.
The above discussion pertains specifically to time-neutral total utilitarianism. We 
emphasize that our discussion of this ethical view is intended as an example, not as an 
endorsement. It is not our aim in this paper to argue for any particular ethical theory—it 
is only to show how long-term trajectories can be important according to some ethical 
theories, and likewise how the study of long-term trajectories should include ethical 
theory in addition to empirical detail. For the many ethical theories that do value future 
events, the study of long-term trajectories is highly important. The stakes are extremely 
large, and there may be a lot that people today can do to have a positive impact. For these
reasons, the long-term trajectories of human civilization should be an important focus of 
both academic scholarship and societal decision-making.
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